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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 920264-CA

v.
Category No. 2

EDWARD H. JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted burglary,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101
and 76-6-202 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as the
appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not involving
a conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly adopt the findings

and conclusions submitted by the prosecution?
"The discretion of adopting the findings as submitted
to the trial court is exclusively in th[e district] court as long
as the findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence."

Bover

Co. v. Licmell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).
2.

Was the trial court's denial of defendant's motion

to suppress correct under the federal constitution?
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we

will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
. . • However, in assessing the trial
court's legal conclusions based upon its
factual findings, we afford it no deference
but apply a "correction of error" standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989) (citations
omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
3.

Has defendant waived the issue of a separate state

constitutional analysis by failure to adequately preserve it;
alternatively, should the Court conduct such analysis in this
case?
M

[T]he proper forum in which to commence
thoughtful and probing analysis of state
constitutional interpretation is before the
trial court, not, as typically happens and as
happened here, for the first time on appeal.
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 1991, defendant was arrested and, on April
1, 1991, charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; and theft, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Record
[hereafter R.] at 10, 7-8).
After the case was bound over, defendant filed a motion
on April 30, 1991, to suppress any statements he had made to law
enforcement, claiming they were taken in violation of "his
Miranda [sic] rights and his fifth and sixth amendment rights"
-2-

(R. at 21). A hearing was held on the motion on May 8, 1991 at
which only the two detectives who took defendant's statements
testified (R. at 23, 140-641).

The court took the matter under

advisement, indicating that his initial inclination was to
suppress the confession but he would reserve his ruling until he
had read the cases provided by the parties (R. at 23, 161). The
State filed a memorandum regarding the admissibility issue on May
9, 1991 (R. at 24-33).
On May 13, 1991, the court entered its ruling, denying
the motion to suppress (R. at 78, 184-87).

On that same day, the

State submitted proposed findings and conclusion, to which
defendant filed objections on May 21, 1991.

On May 24, 1991, the

court signed the findings and conclusions as drafted by the
prosecution (R. at 81-87).
On June 20, 1991, defendant filed a second motion to
suppress his statements, claiming that they were taken "in
violation of his rights to silence and to counsel under the Utah
State Constitution" (R. at 89). He filed a supporting memorandum
on July 3, 1991 (R. at 92-101).

A hearing was conducted on that

motion on July 8, 1991 and the court took the matter under
advisement (R. at 91, 165-70).
The court denied the motion on July 15, 1991, stating
that

fl

[t]he court believed that confession made by the defendant

2

The two transcript volumes are numbered consecutively to the
pleadings volume. Citation will be to the record pages stamped on
the bottom of each page*
-3-

was done in a non accusatory [sic] environment" (R. at 108).2
On November 12, 1991, defendant entered a guilty plea to a
reduced charge of attempted burglary, conditioned on taking this
appeal of the court's denial of his suppression motions (R. at
114-21, 171-80). On February 10, 1992, defendant was sentenced
and placed on probation (R. at 123-24).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of the underlying crime are sketchy in the
record and will not be recited here; the facts pertinent to this
appeal surround the incriminating statements given by defendant
to detectives.
Defendant was arrested March 28, 1991, at his apartment
at 355 North 700 West #2, Salt Lake City, Utah, on suspicion of
burglary and theft (R. at 10). The next day, at 10:14 a.m., two
detectives, who had not been involved in his arrest or booking,
went to the jail to interview him (R. at 141-42, 146, 151). At
the request of the detectives, Newren and Cheever, defendant was
called out of his cell and taken to an interview room where the
detectives waited (R. at 142). The detectives told defendant
that they were doing a "follow-up investigation" of the burglary
and theft which had occurred at 355 North 700 West #3 (a
neighboring apartment) (R. at 143, 152). Before advising him of
any rights under Miranda,3 the detectives first asked him

2

Pages 108-113 are out of order at the back of the pleadings

file.
3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
-4-

identifying questions, such as his name, date of birth, birth
place, living arrangements, and employment (R. at 144).
Defendant was cooperative and answered those questions (R. 14445).

One of the detectives, probably Cheever, asked "something

about what [defendant] did for a living" and defendant said he
was not working at that time (R. 145, 155). There was a slight
pause, then defendant "said at that point that he got the idea in
his head and that he did it, he went into a neighbor's house and
took a coat and stereo, and they [sic] found it" (R. at 155-56).
The statement was not in response to any question about the
burglary; instead, it came "out of the blue" (R. at 155). The
detectives then interrupted defendant and advised him of the
Miranda warnings (R. at 147, 156). After defendant waived his
rights under Miranda/ the detectives began to question him about
the burglary and theft (R. at 147, 156-57).

Defendant gave

further incriminating statements which were not recited at the
hearings (R. at 147, 157).
The detectives testified that they did not use any
physical force, deception, artifice or measure of intimidation to
compel defendant to talk (R. at 149-50, 157-58).

Defendant spoke

English and appeared to have all of his faculties; there were no
signs of impairment such as alcohol or drug use (R. at 158).
Defendant offered no evidence contradicting the testimony of the
detectives.
After the evidence was concluded, the court discussed
the case with counsel, specifically asking the prosecution why
-5-

the detectives did not save all this bother and advise of Miranda
before asking any questions (R. at 160). The court expressed its
inclination to suppress the confession because "[i]t would have
only taken them about a second to read [the warnings] when they
brought him down to investigate; ask about the crime" (R. at
161).

The prosecution presented its argument, relying on Oregon

v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), and the court
reserved its ruling until it had had a chance to review the cases
cited by defendant and the prosecution (R. at 159-64).
On May 13, 1991, the court found the prosecution's
cases to be persuasive and denied the suppression motion.

The

court's personal feelings had not changed since the previous
hearings, he felt that the confession should be suppressed;
however, he felt that the law compelled him to deny the motion
(R. at 184-85).

The prosecutor, as offered, prepared findings of

fact and conclusions of law (R. at 184, 84-87).

Defendant filed

objections thereto; however, the court signed them as prepared by
the prosecution (R. at 81-83, 87).
Over a month later, defendant filed a second motion to
suppress his statements, this time based on the state
constitution (R. at 92-101).

In this motion, defendant stated

that the court should afford greater protections under the state
constitution than those afforded under the federal constitution.
However, defendant did not present any specific way in which that
should be accomplished; he merely asked the court to suppress his
statements under the state constitution (R. at 97-101).
-6-

Defendant did cite to Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1983), for the proposition that Miranda warnings should be
given when "the environment" becomes accusatory (R. at 86);
however, defendant did not link this to the state constitution.
The court denied the second motion, determining that defendant's
statement had been made in a "non accusatory [sic] environment"
(R. at 108).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's adoption of the findings and
conclusions submitted by the prosecution was not "merely
mechanical."

The court had given the decision much thought and

had the benefit of defendant's filed objections to the findings
and conclusions.

The record demonstrates that the court

adequately deliberated and considered the merits of the case
before adopting the proposed findings and conclusions.

Neither

were the findings contrary to any "oral finding" because the
court entered few, if any, findings orally.

Finally, the record

supports the findings so they were not in conflict with the
evidence.
The court correctly denied the suppression motion under
the federal constitution because the biographical data questions
asked of defendant were not "interrogation" in the Miranda sense.
Defendant's volunteered statement that he had committed the
burglary and theft did not come in response to a question which
the officers reasonably should have known would have elicited an
incriminating response.

Even if the volunteered statement should
-7-

have been suppressed, the statements obtained after Miranda
warnings were given were admissible under federal law.

Finally,

defendant's claim that the officers did not record the statements
is not factually correct; they were recorded in the officers'
reports.
Defendant has waived the issue of a separate state
constitutional analysis of his claims because he failed to
preserve them.

The motion below failed to provide "thoughtful

and probing analysis" of the state claim.

Alternatively, the

different Miranda-type requirements sought to be established by
defendant would only cause confusion and unworkable direction to
police officers.

Since there is no current contradictory and

confusing law under the federal standard, there is no need to
adopt a separate state standard.

A separate requirement for

audio or videotaping of the statements before they are admissible
is a change which "should be made only after a full hearing of
all the policy and financial implications and with adequate
advance notice to . . . law enforcement."

Finally, federal law

regarding admission of statements obtained after warning which
followed previous unwarned but uncoerced statements is consistent
with current state law and no reason was given for rejecting the
federal case law.

-8-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADOPTED THE
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS SUBMITTED BY THE
PROSECUTION; ADDITIONALLY, THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE
EVIDENCE OR ANY RULING BY THE COURT
Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by
the prosecution.

Defendant also maintains that the court entered

an oral ruling at the conclusion of the suppression hearing and
that the findings of fact and conclusions of law later signed by
the judge conflicted with that ruling and with the evidence.
Whether to adopt findings as submitted to the court is
within the discretion of the court "as long as the findings are
not clearly contrary to the evidence."
P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977).

Bover Co. v. Liqnell, 567

A court's findings of fact are

upheld unless they are clearly erroneous; however, "in assessing
the trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual
findings, we afford it no deference but apply a 'correction of
error' standard."

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App.

1989), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
In Bover Co. v. Liqnell, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The law is well settled that it is the duty
of the trial judge in contested cases to find
facts upon all material issues submitted for
decision unless findings are waived. The
court may ask counsel to submit findings to
aid the court in making the necessary
findings for the particular case. While we
do not recommend that the trial judge
"mechanically adopt" the findings as prepared
by the prevailing party, we certainly do not
-9-

find such to be the fact in this case* After
the proposed "findings" were submitted by
defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed
objections and proposed amendments which were
argued before the trial court who ultimately
adopted the findings as submitted. The
discretion of adopting the findings as
submitted to the trial court is exclusively
in that court as long as the findings are not
clearly contrary to the evidence.
Id. at 1113-14 (footnotes omitted).

In Automatic Control

Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), the supreme
court rejected a claim that the trial court had erred in
mechanically adopting the findings and conclusions submitted by
counsel.

The court found that M[t]here is no indication from the

record here that the trial judge failed to adequately deliberate
and consider the merits of the case." J[d. at 1260.
After the trial, the court took the case
under advisement, allowing both parties to
submit memoranda, and later requested both
parties to submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
Id.

Defendant cites to a concurring opinion, in which Justice

Zimmerman states that he personally "'feel[s] freer in close
cases to disregard a finding or remand for further findings if
the trial court did not prepare them him [or her] self.'"

Jd. at

1264 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (quoting 9 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578, at 707 (1971)).

Contrary

to defendant's implication at page 11 of his brief, the supreme
court did not cite that portion of the concurrence with approval
in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).
Justice Zimmerman wrote for the unanimous court in Rio Vista.

-10-

The text of the opinion immediately preceding the citation to
Automatic Control reads in pertinent part:
[T]here is an apparent inconsistency between
the reasoning of the findings and conclusions
and the district court's memorandum decision.
The findings and conclusions state [that a
specific defense was not available to
defendant]. Yet in the cursory memorandum
decision, the judge stated that he was not
reaching this issue. The explanation for
this inconsistency may be that the judge
changed his mind. It may also be that
counsel . . ., in drafting the findings and
conclusions, thought that the issue . . .
should be addressed to strengthen the
ultimate conclusion that the statute violated
the constitution . . . . Whatever reason for
this inconsistency, the findings and
conclusions were signed by the judge and are
not attacked here as not representing his
views. We must assume that he found them
satisfactory in all particulars. See
Automatic Control Prods. Corp. . . .
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
Rio Vista, 786 P.2d at 1347.
The cases cited by defendant do not support his
contention that this Court should pay less deference to the
findings and conclusions because they were drafted by counsel.
In the present case, defendant filed objections and proposed
amendments to the findings and conclusions submitted by the
prosecution.

(The proposed findings and conclusions are found at

R. at 84-87, a copy is attached as Addendum A; the objections are
at R. at 81-83, a copy is attached as Addendum B).

There is no

indication in the record that the trial judge "failed to
adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case."
Automatic Control Prods. Corp., 780 P.2d at 1260. After hearing
the evidence surrounding defendant's statements, the court heard
-11-

argument, expressed a preliminary opinion about admissibility,
then took the matter under advisement in order to read the cases
upon which the parties were relying (R. at 160-64).

The next

day, the prosecution filed a memorandum presenting the State's
cases and argument (R. at 24-33, a copy is attached as Addendum
C).

Five days after the hearing, the court found that the cases

presented by the State were persuasive and, "even though [the
court's] feelings were to the contrary," he felt that the law
supported admission of the statements (R. at 184). The court
indicated that he had given the issue considerable thought and,
despite how he felt personally, had come to the conclusion that
the suppression motion had to be denied (R. at 185). The
proposed findings and conclusions were submitted on May 13,
defendant's objections were filed on May 21, and the court signed
the findings and conclusions on May 24 (R. at 88, 83, 87). The
record supports the conclusion that the trial court did not
"mechanically adopt" the findings and conclusions.

The court had

the benefit of defendant's objections and the record indicates
that the court "adequately deliberate[d] and consider[ed] the
merits of the case." J[d. Given the court's personal misgivings
about what the law should be and defendant's filed objections,
the fact that the court signed the findings and conclusions
allows the assumption "that he found them satisfactory in all
particulars."

Rio Vista Oil, 786 P.2d at 1347.

Defendant next argues that the findings and conclusions
conflict with the court's "oral ruling" and with the evidence;
-12-

consequently, defendant maintains that the findings and
conclusions are erroneous and the court's denial of the motion
should be reversed.
A.

"Oral findings"

Defendant argues that the court abdicated its judicial
responsibility by failing to adequately articulate his ruling and
then signing the findings and conclusions submitted by the
prosecution.

He then argues that the findings and conclusions

conflict with the court's "oral findings" (Brief of Appellant
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 12). The appellate courts have
required trial courts to enter findings and conclusions in order
to facilitate review.

See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882

(Utah App.) (factual "findings must be sufficiently detailed in
order to allow us the opportunity to adequately review the
decision below"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (1990); State v.
Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300-1301 (Utah App. 1991) (adequate
findings "ease the burden of appellate review by communicating
the steps by which the ultimate legal conclusions are reached"
and "enable appellate counsel to properly frame the issues on
appeal" and comply with marshaling requirements).

However, there

is no requirement that the findings and conclusions be given
orally in addition to in written form.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)

("It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the
close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
decision filed by the court"); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 469
-13-

(Utah App. 1991) ("Rule 52(a) has been amended to • . . provide
explicitly that the district judge may make the findings of fact
and conclusions of law required in nonjury cases orally").

By

adopting the proposed findings and conclusions, the court
fulfilled its responsibility to enter them.
Defendant's claim that the written findings and
conclusions conflict with the court's "oral findings" also fails
because the court did not enter oral findings.

The court's

questions and discussion at the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing should not be considered its findings of fact. After the
evidence was in, the court asked why the detectives could not
have administered the warnings before asking any questions, and
saved "all the bother" of the suppression motion. The prosecutor
responded by citing a United States Supreme court case
(evidently, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638
(1990)) for the proposition that certain preliminary questions
are not covered by Miranda because they are not interrogation
"designed to elicit a response" (R. at 160). The following
colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: The purpose here, though, was
to see if they couldn't get a confession.
That's what the purpose was, was it not, when
they brought him into the booking office:
name, address, place of employment, nearest
relative. But there is one further point.
MR. MORGAN: They did that, though, your
honor. They had the Miranda [sic] ready.
They were about to do that. They had not
asked a single question. There is nothing
that these people had done that is contrary—
THE COURT: I'll read that case, but,
frankly, I'm inclined to suppress the
confession. It would have only taken them
-14-

about a second to read that when they brought
him down to investigate; ask about the crime.
That's the first thing they ought to do,
because they've already got that information.
Why do they need to ask that? All they
need to do is look at the booking sheet.
•

• •

THE COURT: Let me look at these cases.
But that's where I'm coming from.

THE COURT: I don't think this falls in
the category of booking. There is a
category— brought him down for the sole
purpose of interrogating him about the crime.
When they brought him there, the first thing
they should have said is this is what we're
here for. You read him Miranda, and then
there would be no problem.

THE COURT: As I say, based upon my
knowledge at this time, and I can be
corrected, but I'm inclined to suppress it,
suppress the confession.
(R. at 160-63).

The court was merely discussing his perceptions

of what he thought the officers should have done; however, he
clearly had not reached any final conclusions about the motion.
After he had read the cases provided by counsel, and the
memorandum supplied by the State, he concluded that the
statements would not be suppressed (R. at 184).
Defendant argues that the court's statement that the
detectives' purpose "was to see if they couldn't get a
confession" was a finding of fact (R. at 160). There is no
dispute that the detectives interviewed defendant hoping to
obtain a statement; otherwise, why interview him?
-15-

That is the

meaning behind the court's statement that the detectives were
seeking a confession.

However, as will be noted in Point II,

that general purpose did not convert the detectives' initial
background questions into "interrogation" in the Miranda sense.
B.

Evidence

Defendant also contends that the findings signed by the
court conflict with the evidence presented.

He points again to

the court's statement that the detectives were hoping to obtain a
confession and claims that that conflicts with the finding that
the detectives were "merely requesting biographical data to
assure the interviewing detectives that they were about to
question the right suspect" (R. at 87). The fact that the court
accepted this finding demonstrates that defendant's reading of
the court's statement about the detectives wanting a confession
is out of context.

That questions such as name, date of birth,

etc., were asked to verify that the detectives were interviewing
the right person does not conflict with the court's statement
that the ultimate goal of the detectives was to obtain a
confession.

The preliminary, identifying questions were not

intended to elicit a confession; as the findings state, they
merely served to assure that the correct person was being
interviewed.
Although at the evidentiary hearing the detectives did
not testify specifically that they were asking these questions
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for identification purposes/ that is the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from those questions being asked.

The

detectives had the booking sheet with the pertinent information
before them; however, the detectives were not familiar with
defendant and the questions had to be asked to ascertain whether
the person before them was the person arrested and booked on this
charge (R. at 146).
Defendant next contends that the record does not
support the finding that "defendant responded that he was
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble,
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and
admitted to the burglary" (R. at 85). Portions of that
information did not come out as testimony at the evidentiary
hearing, probably because defendant objected to the detectives
testifying as to what his statements were (R. at 154). After the
court ruled that the detective could relay the substance of
defendant's statement, Detective Cheever gave a cursory synopsis
of the statement (R. at 155). As defendant notes (Br. of App. at
17), and the court stated (R. at 148), a portion of the
preliminary hearing testimony was available to the court (R. at
69-75; a copy is attached as Addendum D).

The preliminary

hearing transcript contains the portion of defendant's statement

^Defendant called the detectives as adverse witnesses and
conducted the examination by means of leading questions; the
officers were never asked specifically their purpose in asking
the preliminary identification questions.
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which defendant now argues was not in the record.

While the

complained of portion was not testified to in the evidentiary
hearing on the suppression motion, it was contained in the
preliminary hearing transcript.

Defendant did not object to the

court having read that preliminary hearing transcript (R. at
148),

The full record demonstrates that there is no conflict

between the finding and the evidence.
Finally, defendant takes exception with the finding (or
conclusion) that "[n]o coercion or deception of any kind was
exercised by the Detectives [sic] in order to induce the
defendant to speak with the police" (R. at 86). The evidence
fully supports this determination by the court.

The

uncontroverted testimony of the detectives was that no physical
force, deception, or intimidation was exercised against defendant
(R. at 149-50, 157-58).
coercion.

Defemdant presented no evidence of

He merely argues that an "incommunicado, unrecorded

interrogation occurring in the small, old booking room at the
jail, wherein two older and experienced Caucasian detectives
questioned a young Native American" must have been coercive (Br.
of App. at 17). While "custodial interrogation is inherently
coercive," State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 n.6 (1990),
cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992), the questions asked of
defendant before administration of the Miranda warnings were not
interrogation (see Point II). Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that the court's determination that there was no
coercion was erroneous.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS IS CORRECT UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
Defendant asserts that suppression of his statements is
mandated by federal constitutional law.

The fifth amendment to

the federal constitution states that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.]"

"Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's

in-custody statements was judged solely by whether they were
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause."
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (1985)
(citations omitted).

"'Absent some officially coerced self-

accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even
the most damning admissions.'"

Id,, at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291

(quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S.
Ct. 1814, 1818 (1977).

Whether a confession is "voluntary" is a

legal question which is reviewed in the totality of the
circumstances.

State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App.

1991) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante,

U.S.

, 111 S. Ct.

1246, 1252 (1991)).
The so-called Miranda rights are "'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures
to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
[is] protected.'"

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291

(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357,
2364 (1974)).

Whether a confession was obtained in violation of
-19-

the "prophylactic Miranda warnings" is separate from the issue of
voluntariness under the fifth amendment.

Elstad, 47 0 U.S. at

305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291. Whether a person was interrogated for
purposes of determining whether Miranda applies is a factual
determination, reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Lavton City v. Araaon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991).
A.

Recording the statements

Defendant first insists that the detectives were
required to "record" defendant's statements5 and that failure to
do so renders their testimony about the statements unreliable.
Defendant does not argue that the recording had to be by audio or
videotape.

As in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989),

"there is no proof to support a determination that any
significant item was omitted from the statement[ or] that
defendant's rights were violated[.]"

The means by which the

detectives recorded James's statements is found in defendant's
brief; defendant states that his statements were recorded in
"Detective Newren's police report, which was not placed in
evidence, but which was provided to defense counsel in discovery"
(Br. of App. at 23). At least Detective Newren (and possibly
5

Defendant gave more than one statement to the officers; how
many were given or the contents of any other than the first
statement is not in the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. The
detectives testified that defendant gave a spontaneous statement to
the effect that "he did it, he went into a neighbor's house and
took a coat and stereo" (R. at 155).
The detectives then
interrupted him and advised him under Miranda (R. at 156, 153).
After he waived his Miranda rights, the detectives asked about the
burglary and defendant made other statements (R. at 147, 70). The
substance of the statements obtained after the Miranda waiver is
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript (R. at 70).
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also Detective Cheever) recorded the statements in the reports
prepared of the investigation.
The fact that the exact words recorded by Detective
Newren were not presented verbatim to the trial court is not a
function of the method or reliability of recording.

Instead, it

is a function of defendant's objection to introduction of the
statement at all. When the prosecution asked Detective Cheever
what defendant said, defense counsel objected to the court
hearing the statement (R. at 154). The objection overruled,
Detective Cheever testified that defendant said he was not
working at that time, then defendant "went into the spontaneous
statement."

Again, defense counsel objected on the basis of

"lack of relevance."
say."

The court said, "Let's hear what he has to

Detective Cheever then gave a cursory summary of

defendant's statement, not claiming that it was verbatim or taken
from his record of the statement (R. at 155). Neither detective
was asked to recite defendant's statement verbatim.
Defendant's claim that the detectives did not "record"
defendant's statements is factually incorrect; the statements
were recorded by the detectives in their reports.

The detectives

were not asked to recite defendant's statements verbatim; in
fact, defendant tried to preclude their recitation at all. The
fact that a verbatim recitation was not given does not indicate
that a verbatim record was not taken.
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B.

Defendant's first statement was not a response to
"interrogation" in the Miranda sense

Defendant states that the detectives "owed" him a
Miranda warning at the outset of their interview (Br. of App. at
25).

There is no dispute that such warnings are required

whenever a person is subjected to "custodial interrogation."
Lavton City v. Araqon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Utah App. 1991).

The

State does not contest that defendant was in custody on the
charge of which he subsequently pled guilty; however, denial of
the suppression motion was correct because defendant's first
statement was not a response to "interrogation" in the context of
Miranda.
Most cases since Miranda was decided in 1966 have dealt
with the custody prong of "custodial interrogation."

In Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688 (1980),
the Court addressed the issue of when an accused was interrogated
in violation of Miranda.

Not "all statements obtained by the

police after a person has been taken into custody are to be
considered the product of interrogation."
at 1689.

.Id,, at 299, 100 S. Ct.

Instead, the Court concluded
that the Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to
either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. That is to say, the term
"interrogation" under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. The latter
portion of this definition focuses primarily
upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
•22-

than the intent of the police. . . . But,
since the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of
their words or actions, the definition of
interrogation can extend only to words or
actions on the part of police officers that
they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.
Id. at 300-302, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (emphasis added; italics in
original) (citations omitted).
Innis was cited with approval in Lavton City v. Araqon,
813 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1991), wherein this Court said:
Cases since Innis have clarified that an
express question from police to a suspect
does not amount to interrogation if, under
the circumstances, the question was not
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. Murphy v. Holland, 845 F.2d 83,
85-86 (4th Cir.1988); United States v.
Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th
Cir.1985). The likelihood of incrimination
must be determined from all of the
circumstances; the same question may
constitute interrogation in one situation but
not in another. For example, in United
States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 466-67,
amended in 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.l986)[,] the
court noted that asking for name, date of
birth, and similar routine biographical data
is ordinarily not an interrogation, but it
was interrogation when asked immediately
after showing a bank robbery suspect
surveillance photos of the robbery and
mentioning his accomplice by name.
Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1215.
Innis is the foundation for Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990), which the prosecution provided
to the court at the evidentiary hearing (R. at 47-53).

In that

decision, four justices determined that there should be an
exception to Miranda requirements for "routine booking questions"
-23-

"which exempt[] from Miranda's [sic] coverage questions to secure
the '"'biographical data necessary to complete booking or
pretrial services.'"'" Id. at 601, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae).
Four other justices found it unnecessary to determine whether the
biographical questions fell within a "routine booking questions"
exception because Muniz's responses were not testimonial. JEcL at
608, 110 S. Ct. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

These

justices appeared to accept the existence of a "routine booking
questions" exception when they stated:
Indeed, had the question [of when Muniz's
sixth birthday occurred] related only to the
date of his birth, it presumably would have
come under the "booking exception to Miranda
[sic] . . ., to which the Court refers
elsewhere in its opinion.
Id. at 607, 110 S. Ct. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).

At least implicitly, eight of the justices

accepted the concept of an exception to Miranda requirements for
routine questions to obtain biographical data.
Muniz is tangentially related to the present case
because the detectives never claimed that they were booking
defendant when they asked for his biographical data (R. at 146).
Muniz is only relevant in that it reaffirms the analysis in Innis
that questions do not amount to interrogation for Miranda
purposes unless the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.
-24-

The decision in Aragon is the most instructive in
analyzing the present case.

tf

[A]n express question from police

to a suspect does not amount to interrogation if, under the
circumstances, the question was not reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response."
omitted).6

Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1215 (citations

In the circumstances of the present case, defendant

was brought into the interview room and told that the detectives
were there to investigate the burglary for which defendant was
arrested (R. at 143). The detectives had not been involved in
the arrest and, presumably, did not know defendant by sight (R.
at 141). In order to ascertain whether the person who had been
brought to the interview room was the same person booked the
night before on this charge, the detectives began to ask
biographical data (R. at 144). Since they had a copy of the
defendant claims that Aragon and the cases cited therein
confuse the "express questioning" with the "functional equivalent"
of interrogation (Br. of App. at 26 n.8). Defendant does not
analyze why an express question which is not reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response should be treated any differently
than a functional equivalent of interrogation. As noted in Aragon,
courts have recognized that Miranda interrogation requires some
knowledge that a question, or its functional equivalent, must be
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Aragon,
813 P.2d at 1215. In Innis, the Supreme Court said:
The concern of the Court in Miranda was that
the "interrogation environment" created by the
interplay of interrogation and custody would
"subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner" and thereby undermine the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination.
Id. 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688 (citation omitted).
Questions which do not serve to undermine the privilege against
self-incrimination do not raise a Miranda concern. See also Muniz,
496 U.S. at 601-602, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (plurality opinion)
(questions which appear to be "reasonably related to the police's
administrative concerns . . . fall outside the protections of
Miranda").
-25-

booking sheet with them, they could then compare the answers on
the booking sheet with the answers then being given by defendant
to verify his identity (R. at 146; Finding of Fact #4, R. at 85).
When one of the detectives asked about employment, defendant said
he was not working at the time, paused, then said that he got the
idea in his head, went into a neighbor's house and took a coat
and stereo (R. at 155-56).

The detectives could not have

reasonably known that a question about whether defendant was
employed was likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Since

they could not reasonably have known that a question about
employment would elicit an incriminating response, the question
does not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes.

Innis,

446 U.S. at 302, 100 S. Ct. at 1690.
C.

Post-Miranda

statements.

In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285
(1985), the Supreme Court held that "a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been
given the requisite Miranda warnings." .Id. at 318, 105 S. Ct. at
1298.

This decision is based on the fact that the prophylactic

warnings mandated by Miranda do not rise to the level of a
constitutional mandate; thus, a violation of Miranda is not
necessarily a violation of the fifth amendment. .Id. at 305, 105
S. Ct. at 1291. Only if the statement sought to be introduced
against defendant was obtained by compulsion must it be
suppressed as a violation of the fifth amendment. .Id. The Utah
-26-

Supreme Court adopted the Elstad reasoning in State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 465-66 (Utah 1988).
Even if the detectives had been required to advise
defendant of the Miranda warnings before asking for biographical
data, the failure to do so was corrected (barring actual
coercion) by the subsequent advisement (R. at 156-57).

After

defendant blurted out a confession, the detectives interrupted
him and gave him the warnings; he waived his right to remain
silent and to have an attorney present (R. at 157). Apparently,
he then gave additional incriminating statements (R. at 70).
Elstad teaches that a failure to warn a suspect is cured by a
subsequent warning; the statements given after the warning are
admissible.

"A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to

a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement."
1296.

JDd. at 314, 105 S. Ct. at

The fact that the statements obtained after a Miranda

waiver are admissible makes admission of the earlier statement
harmless, if error at all.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 466.7

The fifth amendment aspect of Elstad requires analysis
of the voluntariness of defendant's statements because a Miranda
warning would not cure a fifth amendment violation.

Ld. at 806-

807, 105 S. Ct. at 1292. A review of the record demonstrates
that the interview of defendant "had none of the earmarks of
7

There is nothing in the record regarding whether the postMiranda statements contained items not found in the pre-Miranda
statement.
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coercion."

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316, 105 S. Ct. at 1296. In

Bishop, the supreme court illustrated some of those earmarks:
The record discloses that defendant was
not unlawfully detained by police and that
the officers made no threats, promises, or
inducements to obtain the confession. And
although the officers' statements were direct
and contained profanity, when viewed in light
of defendant's age, education, and
background, we are not in the least satisfied
that [the confession was involuntary].
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464. The court also noted that Bishop was
not subjected to unduly long periods of questioning; the presence
of a number of officers was not coercive; and Bishop's contention
that he was particularly susceptible because he was tired was not
supported by the record.

Id.. See also State v. Heqelman, 717

P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) ("Evidence sufficient to support a
finding that a confession is unvoluntary must reveal some
physical or psychological force or manipulation that is designed
to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have
done so.").
After the evidentiary hearing, the court determined
that defendant "was subjected to neither coercion, physical or
psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or
deception of any kind"

(R. at 86, Conclusion of Law #1).

At the

hearing, defendant presented no evidence to refute the
detectives' testimony that they had offered no physical force,
deception, intimidation, or promises to induce defendant's
statements (R. at 149-50, 158). Defendant spoke English and
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appeared to have all of his "faculties"; in addition, there were
no indications of alcohol or drug use (R. at 158).
Defendant asks this Court to presume involuntariness by
assuming certain facts and certain emotions on the part of
defendant which are not in the record.

(Br. of App. at 34-35).

The room in which the interview occurred is 12 feet by 13 feet,
but there was no evidence that it was "isolated."

(Br. of App.

at 34; R. at 143). The fact that there were two detectives is "a
factor to consider"; however, "the presence of more than one
officer during" the interview was not sufficient to cause the
statements to be involuntary.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464. There

was no evidence that defendant was "isolated from his family and
friends, and from attorneys."

(Br. of App. at 34). There was no

evidence presented at the hearing about defendant's age, although
from the booking sheet it appears he claimed to be nearly twenty
(R. at 10). There was no evidence that defendant was
"undoubtedly aware that, in the isolated circumstances of the
interrogation, with no recording device in use, whatever was to
happen in the old booking area of the jail with the two
detectives would occur without witnesses."
35).

(Br. of App. at 34-

This melodramatic recitation has no basis in the record.

The unrefuted testimony of the detectives was that defendant was
cooperative and voluntarily answered their questions,
spontaneously volunteering that he had committed the crime (R. at
147, 149, 155-56).

The evidence does not support an assumption

that defendant feared the officers.
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There is also no evidence

that the coercive factors delineated in Bishop existed in the
present case.
In summary, defendant's statements were voluntary under
federal constitutional analysis and thus were admissible under
the fifth amendment.

There was no requirement to give Miranda

warnings because the preliminary biographical questions asked of
defendant were not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
responses.

Defendant's volunteered statement that he committed

the crime was admissible and the statements obtained after the
warnings and waiver was admissible under Elstad even if the first
statement were suppressed.
POINT III
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT GROUNDS FOR
ADDRESSING HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT;
ADDITIONALLY, THIS CASE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE
A NEED FOR SEPARATE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
Defendant asks this Court to conduct a separate state
constitutional analysis and suppress his statements.
A.

Waiver

After the court denied suppression under the federal
constitution, defendant filed a motion to suppress under the
state constitution (R. at 92-101; a copy is attached as Addendum
E).

Although the motion is ten pages long and cites several

cases, a careful reading demonstrates that the motion asks for a
separate state constitutional analysis but fails to provide such
analysis.

The cases cited in the motion all indicate that the

appellate courts of this state will conduct a separate state
-30-

constitutional analysis in the proper circumstances; defendant
then asked the trial court to afford him "broader individual
protections" under the state constitution (R. at 100). On
appeal, defendant specifically asks that the Court require under
the state constitution that all statements be recorded,
presumably by audio or videotape, and that Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), be rejected (Br. of App. at 42-46).
Defendant's motion to suppress under the state constitution
neglected to specify what "broader" protections he was seeking
and the reasons the federal protections were not adequate.
Failure to provide "thoughtful and probing analysis of state
constitutional interpretation" to the trial court, i.e., by
specifying what additional protections the state constitution
should afford and why federal analysis was inadequate, precludes
considering this issue on appeal.
1272-73 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,

See also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,

77-78 (Utah App. 1990), and authorities cited therein.
B.

The federal test for admissibility of a confession
has been accepted as workable by Utah courts;
consequently, no separate state constitutional
analysis is needed

As set forth above, this Court should not reach the
merits of defendant's belated state constitutional argument for
the suppression of his confession because he has failed to
preserve the issue.

However, if the Court does address the

merits, defendant has failed to articulate any reason for finding
a different protection under the state constitution.
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Resort to state constitutional analysis is necessary
only when changing federal law is confusing, contradictory to
state appellate decisions, and erodes constitutional guarantees.
These considerations were foremost in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460 (Utah 1990), wherein two justices of the Utah Supreme Court
eschewed federal law regarding automobile searches in favor of an
analysis under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
See id. at 465 (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688
P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984)).
consistency.

The Larocco plurality was also seeking

JId. at 466-69 (decrying federal search and seizure

law as a contradictory "labyrinth").

See also State v. Vigil,

815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991) (appellate courts have duty
to provide "unambiguous direction").

Defendant has not presented

any confusion, contradiction or erosion of constitutional
guarantees compelling adoption of a different state analysis of
self-incrimination law.
C.

Adoption of a different Miranda requirement under
the state constitution is not necessary

As this Court noted in State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111
(Utah App. 1990):
The Utah Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled upon the question of whether Miranda
warnings are required under the Utah
Constitution.
Id. at 113-14 n.2 (citing Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting)).

Defendant

asks this Court to adopt the Miranda requirements under the state
constitution and to extend them beyond the boundaries established
-32-
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be compelled "to be a witness
against
himself," whereas article I, section 1 2 of
the Utah Constitution says, "The accused
shall not be compelled to give
evidence
against himsel£ "
Id. (emphasis in original)

T h e hi st CM i c H 1 tfK:kgnii..nd of

adtjf nioiOFi ol I he state cc.tr ^ tut ion demonstrates that the state
constitutional privilege was intended to have the same sc: ope as
the federal privilege, "which was I he scope il had at
]_d , a "

OOIWIIUII

See also Sandy City v. Larson, "733 P • 2d 1!7 ,
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138 (Utah 1987) (since the scope of article I, section 12 is no
broader than its federal counterpart, although the case was
decided under the state constitution, "cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court and others offer guidance."); In the
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. CS-1,
754 P.2d 633, 645 (Utah 1988) ("To the extent that the common law
defines the privilege, the federal and state provisions have been
interpreted similarly.").
Miranda warnings themselves are not required by the
federal constitution.

As the Supreme Court stated in Elstad;

"The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore
are 'not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but [are] instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination [is] protected.' . . .
Requiring Miranda warnings before custodial
interrogation provides 'practical
reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment
right."
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting New York v.
Ouarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 (1984), in turn
quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357,
2364 (1974)).

If this Court chooses to adopt the requirement of

Miranda warnings under the state constitution, it should not
elevate those judicially created requirements to the level of
constitutional requirements.

The federal constitution does not

require Miranda warnings; instead, the Supreme Court established
the requirement in order to ensure that a person subjected to
custodial interrogation who waives his privilege against selfincrimination and right to counsel does so knowingly and
-34-

intelligent. 1 y , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S

436 , 475J 86 S , Ct,

1602, 1628 ( 1966) .
hw Jy 111y ori Salt. Lake City v. Garner, b64 P , 2d I, 1.6\:\
(Utah 1983
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under the Constitute
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The experience
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u L«?J guidance
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Oregon appellate courts
>

demonstrate
to adopt ,-. . federal Miranda J av
Court remanded Oregon v. Elstad
addressed

-

. s

anv r

Whei 1, the United States Supreme
fhp court of appeals of Oregon

1 lie Oregon cujibl .1 t.utJ on precluded

use of his second confession even though the federal constitution
did
rev, r
thai
under
fi

•

State v. Elstad,
..

P Or.App

3f ., 7]7 F ;M 1/4, ±/;>,

.Mi i',/ii 'H'I

*hp court stated

. had declined previously "to adopt :; different standard
Oregon constitution for Miranda -"Ml"

lil

"" '•*--

si ateiiieiyiLs
•

quoted:

"Although we may interpret our own state
constitution to provide greater protection to
our citizens than United States Supreme court
interpretations of the federal constitution
provide, . . . steps to adopt a stricter
standard should be taken cautiously and be
supported by reasoned analysis and sound
policy considerations."
Id. (quoting State v. Mills, 76 Or.App. 301, 305, 710 P.2d 148
(1985), review denied, 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986); other
citations omitted).

The court did "not find, nor has defendant

identified, principles, precedents or criteria that persuade[d
them] to adopt a different rule." JTcl. at 176 (citations
omitted).
Shortly thereafter, the Oregon Supreme Court split on
the issue of whether Miranda-type warnings were required under
the state constitution.

In State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d

894 (1986), the defendant asked for a holding that the state
constitution require Miranda warnings at a time earlier than
required by federal case law. J^d.. at 903. Writing for a threejudge plurality, Justice Campbell concluded that adoption of
Miranda warnings under the state constitution was not warranted.
He noted that there was no mention in the state constitution of
any required warnings. JEd. at 904. He then gave the history of
the warnings since Miranda, and noted the plethora of cases since
1966 which have explicated the permutations of Miranda.
plurality opinion said:
If we adopted a different Oregon Miranda rule
or placed a different interpretation upon the
present federal rule, then we have created
confusion. We doubt that the "task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to
-36-

The

determine, whether particular confessions
were voluntary" would have created a greater
case load for the courts than the flood of
cases in the last 20 years that have tried to
determine the correct application of the
federal Miranda warnings,
Oregon is in this situation: We have the
federal Miranda warnings. By virtue of the
Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
we have no choice. . . . We think that it is
important to keep the Oregon law on
confessions and admissions intact
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule identical
to the federal rule without any commitment to
future interpretations would be unwise. We
would be in the same position as we are
today, except that the ranch would have been
sold with no down payment. To adopt an
Oregon Miranda rule identical to the federal
rule and tie it to future interpretation by
the federal caselaw would be foolish. We do
not know what may be waiting in the alley,
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule identical to
the federal rule and place our own future
interpretation on it would only further
confuse an already confused area of the law.
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule different
from the federal ru3 e is not warranted.
Id. at 905-906 (footnote omitted), fi fourth justice concurred in
the resul t bi it stated Una l hu> l>>] Ieveii the court hfid! a J, ready
adopted Miranda-type warnings under the state constitution.
at 906-907,

Id ,

The remaining three justices,, i n dissent,

refrained from stating that Article I,
section 12, itself requires warnings before
questioning. .
. [T]here is no need for a
court to freeze details into constitutional
law when guidance can be found in laws like
[Oregon statutes requiring Miranda-type
warnings in specified circumstances] that <
be further considered and refined by the
ordinary lawmaking process.
Id. at: 913-14.
'":

.

Smith

: ^ed by the Oregon Supreme

Court the next year .:;• State v. Kell, 303 Or. 89, 7;i4 P. 2d 334,
-37-

337 n.2 (1987).

Kell did not involve a question of whether

Miranda warnings should be given; instead, it asked what police
may do when a suspect in custody only partially waives his right
against self-incrimination.

JId. at 336-37.

The Oregon court

said:
[W]e must evaluate the issue of waiver in the
light both of Oregon's sole responsibility
for the meaning of the Oregon Constitution
and of the benefits of adhering to rules
which are widely followed outside Oregon and
which we consider to be satisfactory.
Although no authority outside Oregon can
control our decision, there is no value in
being different merely for the sake of the
difference. That other courts generally
follow a particular rule and that it appears
to us to work satisfactorily are reasons in
favor of following it in Oregon. . . .
[In a
prior case, the court refused to require
under the state constitution more detailed
warnings than Miranda warnings.] We did so
because we did not believe that the
alternative warnings were a sufficient
improvement to justify a variation from the
federal rule[.] . . . A majority of this
court has not been able to agree whether
Miranda-type warnings are required under the
Oregon Constitution.
Id. at 336-37 (footnote omitted).
A few months later, noting the split in Smith and
without direct citation to the state constitution, the court
decided that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes in
State v. Macree, 304 Or. 261, 744 P.2d 250 (1987).

The majority

declared that it need not match the facts of this case to those
in "the few cases decided by the United States Supreme Court."
Id. at 253.

Instead, the majority asserted that "Oregon law

furnishes an independent basis of decision."
-38-
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:- equivalent, before Miranda

concurred ;. ;.;^ result o,>. pointed

*. the Magee case had

not conclusively established that Miranda-type warnings were
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Pointing

.
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tfrown,

issent : .lowing in Brown, - > concurring

judges stated, "If Newman,
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correct that
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Finally,.

i| t.hd'1' Magee requi red
isuspect

?/. The issm
16

le

circumstances
of custody hadl no

This recitation of the route Oregon has taken points
out the confusion that may follow if this Court decides in this
case to pursue a state constitutional analysis.

If the Court

adopts the federal rule and ties it to future interpretation by
federal courts, that interpretation may not conform to what the
appellate courts of this State deem appropriate.

If the Court

adopts the federal rule and places its own future interpretation
on it, the Court may find itself in a morass similar to the one
in which Oregon finds itself.

Adopting a standard which may only

cause confusion serves no legitimate purpose.
Defendant apparently asks this Court to require
Miranda-type warnings from the outset of an interview between an
accused and police officers. Adopting this position would
preclude use of volunteered statements or statements in response
to questions not intended to elicit an incriminating response, if
these statements happened to come out before the warnings were
given.

Alternatively, defendant seems to be asking that warnings

be required for any interrogation, whether the suspect is in
custody or not. Adopting this position would unnecessarily
hamstring law enforcement efforts.

"Because Miranda warnings may

inhibit persons from giving information, this court has
determined that they need be administered only after the person
is taken into 'custody' or his freedom has otherwise been
significantly restrained."

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S. Ct.

at 1293 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1629).
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helpful.
1

a requirement :

1 :i a s a d d r e s s e d I: h e I s s u e a n d adopted
audio

videotaping of statements, where

feasible, under their state constitution.
Alaska

8

•

.deotaped ;.*?... r.

state constitution

P

-

i

Stephan v, State, 711

However, I t di d so only

No person shall be dapi i ved n| 1. i,U»ll(
without due process of law

I i her t ,' m

[ipupeify,

because it had, five years before, informed state law enforcement
officials that they must tape record, where feasible, any
questioning of suspects.

3jd. at 1157. Nine other states have

expressly declined to follow Alaska's lead.

See State v.

Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455 (1991); Gale v. State, 792
P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990); Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d
694 (1989); People v. Everette, 187 Ill.App.3d 1063, 135 111.Dec.
472, 543 N.E.2d 1040 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 141 111.2d
147, 152 111.Dec. 377, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (1990); State v. Gorton,
149 Vt. 602, 548 A.2d 419 (1988); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d
201 (Miss.1988); Coleman v. State, 189 Ga.App. 366, 375 S.E.2d
663 (1988); State v. Spuraeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 P.2d 960
(1991), rev, denied, 118 Wash.2d 1024, 827 P.2d 1393; People v.
Raibon,

P.2d

, 1992 WL 119794 (Colo.App. June 4, 1992)

(not yet released for publication).

The Nevada Supreme Court

stated that, "the concern is with the reliability of the
testimony of the detectives, not with some unconstitutional
action."

The evidence of a failure to tape record the

interrogation and the point that this failure called into
question the reliability of the officers' testimony were argued
to the jury.

"The jury's determination that the detectives'

testimony was truthful is sufficient to quiet concerns of
reliability."

Jimenez, 775 P.2d at 696-97.

The Illinois

appellate court stated:
[T]he most appropriate means of augmenting
the due process rights of citizens,
especially in view of the ramifications of
the rule urged by defendant, is through
-42-

legislation. . • • "In the absence of
legislation, we do not believe it appropriate
to require, by judicial fiat, that all
statements taken of a person in custody" be
recorded or transcribed.
Everette 543 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing and quoting Vermont v.
Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 422 (Vt. 1988)).

The Washington appellate

court explained:
[I]t is our view that such a sweeping
change in long standing police practice
should be made only after a full hearing of
all the policy and financial implications and
with adequate advance notice to a [sic] law
enforcement in the form of the adoption of a
rule of evidence or a statute mandating
recording.
Spurqeon, 820 P.2d at 963 (footnotes omitted).

A requirement to

tape or video record all interrogations should be addressed to a
legislative or rulemaking body so that a full hearing on the
implications of such a requirement could be held.

This court

should follow the lead of the majority of the states and decline
to adopt such a requirement under the state constitution.
E.

The rule propounded in Elstad
under Utah law

is appropriate

Finally, defendant asks this Court to presume that an
unwarned confession taints any subsequent statements made after
Miranda warnings.

This "cat-out-of-the-bag" analysis was

specifically rejected by the United State Supreme Court in
Elstad.9

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311-13, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-96.

defendant's quotation from United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S.
532, 540-41, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1947), is disingenuous because
defendant left off the conclusion of the paragraph, which reads:
But this Court has never gone so far as to
hold
that
making
a
confession
under
-43-

Defendant's claim that Elstad is inconsistent with or blurred the
"bright line" of Miranda was also rejected by the Supreme Court.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S. Ct. at 1297 ("The Court today in
no way retreats from the bright-line rule of Miranda.").

The

holding of Elstad is based on, and consistent with, Miranda and
its other progeny; defendant's bald assertion, without analysis,
that this is "confusing precedent" (Br. of App. at 45) does not
support a rejection of Elstad.
Defendant also states that Elstad is inconsistent with
prior state law; however, he has failed to support this argument.
He cited to State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 184 and
192 (1943) (plurality opinion), for the proposition that a
confession "obtained by improper influences" may taint a
subsequent statement (Br. of App. at 45-46).

Elstad does not

conflict with that proposition; a statement obtained by coercion,
i.e., an improper influence, is inadmissible under the fifth
amendment.

Elstad allows admission of statements obtained after

proper Miranda warnings, even though a prior statement was
obtained in violation of Miranda.

Elstad did not allow admission

of subsequent statements if the original statements were obtained
in violation of the fifth amendment.
The other cases cited by defendant, State v. Ruqqeri,
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967), and In re Criminal

circumstances
which
preclude
its
use,
perpetually disables the confessor from making
a usable one after those conditions have been
removed.
-44-

Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), involve the rights of a
person being targeted by a grand jury (Ruggeri), and a person
being questioned under subpoena powers (Criminal Investigation^;
neither of these cases is analogous to the present case. Whether
a person should be warned that he is a target of a grand jury or
warned of a right to an attorney and avoid self-incrimination,
has no applicability to whether a person subjected to custodial
interrogation can waive his right to remain silent after having
given a prior, unwarned statement.
Defendant has failed to establish any contradiction or
confusion to justify providing separate state constitutional
analysis in this case.

Neither has he provided any legal or

policy justification for imposing the additional requirements he
seeks under the state constitution.

Consequently, this Court

should decline to establish different state constitutional
requirements in the realm of confessions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <£*?— day of January,
1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General

-45-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Elizabeth A. Bowman and Elizabeth Holbrook, SALT LAKE LEGAL
DEFENDER ASSOC, Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

j£*~ day of January,

1993.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

v.
EDWARD H. JAMES,
Defendant

Case No. 911900562FS
Before Hon. John A. Rokich

A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this
Court on May 8, 1991, the State being represented by its counsel,
B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant being
present and represented by his counsel, Elizabeth A. Bowman,
Esq., and the Court having taken testimony in the matter, having
heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the authorities submitted
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters
its:

U0084

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Page 2
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991 for the offense of
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A.
and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor alleged to have been committed
at 355 North 700 West, Salt Lake County, Utah on the same day as
his arrest.
2. From the time of his arrest until the interview conducted
the following morning at 10:14 O'clock A. M., the defendant was
not questioned by the police about any matter.
the defendant

invoke his right to remain

At no time did

silent

or request

counsel.
3. On March 29, 1991, the defendant was called out from the
general

population

into

the

booking

area

of

the

jail

and

confronted by Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary Newren and
Steve Cheever who immediately announced they were police officers
whose purpose was to discuss the burglary committed the previous
day.
4. The detectives then asked the defendant general questions
about his identity for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
correct person was being interviewed.
5. Detective Cheever questioned the defendant about his
present employment to which the defendant responded that he was
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble,
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and
admitted to the burglary.

UU085

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Page 3
6. Detectives Newren and Cheever interrupted the defendant
and read him his rights pursuant to Miranda

v. Arizona,

to which

the defendant responded that he understood each of those rights
and agreed to speak to the Detectives about the burglary.

The

defendant

the

thereupon

gave

a

detailed

confession

about

burglary.
7. No coercion or deception of any kind was exercised by the
Detectives in order to induce the defendant to speak with the
police.

Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The mere fact that the defendant was in jail and called
into the booking area does not render any statement made in
response to police questioning involuntary under the totality of
the circumstances, but rather is only a factor to be considered
among the other circumstances of the interview.
uncontradicted

Based on the

testimony of the Detectives who conducted the

interview that the defendant freely volunteered the information
requested and was subjected to neither coercion, physical or
psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or
deception

of

any kind, the

statements were voluntarily

Court concludes

the

defendants

given under the totality

of the

circumstances.
2. The police are not required to give Miranda

admonitions

to a defendant who is in custody prior to asking routine booking

jinnee

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Page 4
questions which the police have no reason to know are reasonably
likely

to

elicit

an

incriminating

elicited prior to giving Miranda

response.

The

questions

admonitions in this case were

merely requesting biographical data to assure the interviewing
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect.
3. Notwithstanding any unwarned but nonetheless voluntary
statement made prior to the Miranda warnings in this case, even
if the unwarned statements resulted from interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda,

there is no constitutional requirement that

this Court suppress the defendant's post-Miranda statements.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
Defendants Motion to Suppress is denied.

£L day

DATED t h i s o(r

of May, 1991,

/vy*v

rObN A. ROKICH
s t r i c t Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LA!
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
OBJECTIONS OF FINDINGS OF
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDWARD JAMES,

Case No. 911900562FS
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

Defendant.

FACTS
State's Fact No. 1 should have the following sentence
added:

The booking process on Mr. James was completed at that time,
State's Fact No. 3 should read as follows:
On March 29, 1991, the defendant was escorted by a jailer

to the old booking area (now an interview area no longer used as
booking) of the jail where two Salt Lake City Police Officers

had

requested he be brought.
The two officers, Newren and Cheever announced they were
police officers and that they wanted to interview the defendant on
the burglary charge.

They were not obtaining any information for

the purpose of booking.
Prior to interviewing Mr. James the officers did not

UU081

Mirandize Mr. James nor did they inform him of his right to silence.
State's Fact No. 4 should read as follows:
No testimony regarding the purpose of the interview other
than the stated purpose of investigation of the burglary was
Solicited at the Motion to Suppress.
State's Fact No. 6 should include:
6.

After the statements were made by Mr. James the

detectives read him his Miranda warnings.
State's Fact No. 7 should read as follows:
The defendant is a young Native American.
were considerably older and white.

Both officers

The white officers were in a

position of power compared to the inmate.
CONCLUSIONS
The defendant was escorted by a guard, while he was in
custody, to an interview area (the old booking area).

Two white,

experienced police officers introduced themselves and proceeded to
interview Mr. James about the burglary without first Mirandizing
him, Mr. James was never told he did not have to accede to the
interview.

Several questions into the interview and in response to

questions from the second officer, Mr. James made statments about
the offense.

The officer then Mirandized Mr. James who made more

statements.
The State's reliance on the "booking questions" exception
is misplaced for several reasons.
before.

Mr. James was booked the evening

The booking process was complete.

The old booking area is

now used for interviews and that is where the interview took place.

U0082

The new booking area is in a different area of the jail.

The

booking procedure at the Salt Lake County Jail is done by Sheriff's
Office employees.

The two officers involved in questioning Mr.

James were employed by the Salt Lake City Police Department.

The

stated purpose of the interview was to investigate the burglary.
The Court cannot conclude the information was freely
volunteered because that entails a knowing waiver of one's rights
unless the information is not elicited by the officers.

Here, the

officer elicited the information by directing Mr.James be brought to
them and by asking him questions.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH
Third District Court

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

day of May, 1991.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM RE:
ADMISSIBILITY OF
POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS

v.

FOLLOWING UNWARNED
STATEMENTS

EDWARD H. JAMES,

Case No. 911900562FS

Defendant

Before Hon. John A. Rokich

ISSUE
Defendant claims that impermissibly coercive methods were
used by police to extract his confession, thereby making it
involuntary.

Defendant further contends that his rights under

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) were violated because the

police delayed in advising him of his Miranda rights.

i\i\
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant is charged with the offenses of Burglary, a
Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A., and Theft,
a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of §76-6-404 U.C.A. alleged to
have been committed at 355 North 700 West i3, Salt Lake County,
Utah on March 28, 1991.
Defendant was arrested on March 28, 1991 and booked into the
Salt Lake County Jail that evening.

An Information was filed on

April 1, 1991, and the defendant was informed of the formal
charges and appointed counsel the following day by Third Circuit
Court

Judge

Eleanor

Van

Sciver.

A. a

preliminary

hearing

conference held before Third Circuit Court Judge Jones on April
9,

1991

failed

preliminary

to provide

hearing

was

any resolution

held

on

April

on the
16,

case. The

1991.

After

considering the evidence presented by the State, Judge Jones
bound the defendant over as charged to enter a plea in this
Court.
The defendant pled not guilty to the charges on April 29,
1991, obtained a reduction in bail and orally notified the Court
the defendant intended to file a Motion to Suppress.

Without

disclosing the nature of the Motion, a hearing was scheduled for
May 8, 1991. The written Motion was received by the State on May
1, 1991 disclosing in general terms that statements were sought
to be suppressed because of a violation of Miranda rights.
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FACTS
A hearing was held on March 8, 1991 wherein through the
uncontradicted testimony of Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary
Newren

and

Detective

Steve

Cheever,

the

following

facts

surrounding the interview of the defendant on March 29, 1991 were
adduced.

Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake

County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991.

There is no

evidence of any intervening events before the police questioned
the defendant.

Nor is there any indication that the defendant

refused to speak with the police or requested the advice of
counsel prior to the interview the following morning on March 29,
1991 at 10:14 O'clock, A.M.
It is uncontested that defendant was in custody at the time
of the interview.

He was called out from the general population

of the jail and removed to the booking area of the jail.
The interview began with a complete and honest disclosure by
Detectives

Newren

and

Cheever

announcing

they

were

police

officers who were there to discuss the very burglary for which
the defendant was being held in jail.

nnno
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Following this disclosure, the defendant was asked general
questions relating to his identity.

The defendant was asked his

name, his date of birth, his current living arrangements and
about his employment.

In regard to Detective Cheever asking the

defendant about his employment, the defendant stated he was not
working at the time, then paused, and added, "that this is when
he got into trouble,11... wat such times, he gets things into his
head and does them" and admitted to the burglary.
At this point, defendant was

interrupted

by the police

detectives and informed of his right to remain silent, his right
to counsel and the right to appointment of counsel if he could
not afford them pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.

The defendant

stated that he understood each of these rights, and agreed to
talk to the detectives about the burglary.

A detailed confession

was thereupon obtained.
Each

of

the

Detectives

stated

that

they

believed

the

defendant's statements during the entire interview were given
voluntarily, and that neither coercion nor improper inducements
were used to prompt the defendant to speak with them.

They

further specifically testified that no use of physical force,
intimidation or representations of deception were used to elicit
any statement from the defendant.
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ARGUMENT
Defendants claims under "involuntariness" and Hthe denial
of due process pursuant to Miranda" are two separate and distinct
questions that require an entirely different analysis.

With

respect to the claim that his statements were involuntary, and
therefore are inadmissible in contravention of his right to be
free from compelled self-incrimination, both the Utah and United
States

Supreme

Court

circumstances standard".
(Utah 1988); Schneckloth

have

adopted

State

the

"totality

v. Bishop,

v. Bustamonte,

of

the

753 P. 2d 439, 463

412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).

Factors to be considered in the determination of whether a
confession is voluntarily given include assessing the degree to
which the police may have used physical or psychological force
designed to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would
not have done so.

Clearly, the use of violence or threats of

violence will render a confession involuntary.

Pyschological

coercion may exist where the police use improper influences or
promises.

Further, the defendant's age, education and background

are relevant to determine his understanding of the questioning
and his will to resist questionable police conduct.
Watts,

State

v.

639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981).
As applied to this case, defendant alleges only that he was

in jail, called to an interview room and confronted by two police
officers as factors to consider
involuntary.
taken with

in rendering his statements

Under the totality of the circumstances, especially
the

uncontroverted

testimony

of

the

interviewing

Memorandum
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detectives, no shred of evidence of coercion has been introduced.
See State

v.

voluntary

Bishop,

despite

753 P.2d 439, 464 (Utah 1988) (confession
lengthy

questioning

and

numerous

police

officers present during questioning)•
A

fair

characterization

of

the

detectives had to interject Miranda
defendant's

outburst

evidence
warnings

is

that

the

in between the

of unburdening his guilt.

To consider

removal of the accused from the general jail population to an
interview

area

as

a

per

se

involuntary

environment

would

virtually preclude questioning of any individual after he had
been booked.

Clearly defendant's entire statement was voluntary

under the totality of the circumstances.
The next issue to be resolved is the legal effect of a delay
in communicating to the defendant his rights under Miranda.
now famous Miranda
Supreme
custodial

Court's

admonitions

determination

circumstances

may

arose
that

be

from

the United

interrogation

inherently

in

The
States

certain

coercive.

The

requirement that the accused be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed was designed to even
the scale between the police and the accused.

"The prophylactic

Miranda warnings therefore are not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.
York v. Quarles,

New

467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
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The requirements of Miranda

become relevant only when an

individual is (1) in custody, and (2) subjected to interrogation,
Arizona

v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode Island

U.S. 291 (1980).

v. Innis,

446

The State necessarily concedes a defendant in

jail is in custody.
However,

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

has

recently

affirmed the "routine booking question11 exception which exempts
from Miranda's

coverage questions to secure the biographical data

necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.
v.

Muniz,

110 L.Ed.2d 528, 552 (1990).

Pennsylvania

Prior to defendant's

blurting out his misdeeds, all of the questions presented by the
detectives can be appropriately characterized as routine booking
questions designed merely to properly identify the person they
were

about

to

question

about

criminal

activity.

The

determination of when interrogation has begun for the purpose of
triggering Miranda has been defined as "words or action on the
part of police that they should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response."
at page 301.

Rhode Island

v. Innisf

supra

The preliminary questions asked by the detectives

do not rise to the level of interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda in this case.
Notwithstanding

an

argument

of

interrogation

to

the

contrary, the law remains clear that only the statements prior to
Miranda

need be suppressed

Both the Utah and United States

Supreme Courts have held on cases factually on point that the
Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require
the

suppression

of

a confession,

made

after

proper

Miranda
IUIA1A
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warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police
had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the
suspect.
supra.

Oregon v. Elstad,

470 U.S. 298 (1985); State

v.

Bishop,

These cases reasoned:
If errors are made by law enforcement officers in
administering the prophylactic Miranda Procedures, they
should not breed the same irremediable consequences as
police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an
unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that simple failure
to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the
investigatory process that subsequent voluntary and informed
waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though
Miranda
requires that the unwarned admission must be
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement
should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is
knowingly and voluntarily made. Elstad at page 309.

Under the most gracious weight afforded to the evidence as
viewed from the perspective of the defendant, only the unwarned
statement could be supressed under the law.
Defendant's reliance upon State

v. Sampson

is misplaced.

That case turned on the issue of invoking the right to counsel
after Miranda

admonitions were given.

No request for counsel,

equivocal or otherwise was made in this case.

Sampson has no

persuasive value in the matter before this Court.

Clearly, the

defendants claim of a violation of Miranda is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's claims of involuntariness and deprivation of his
rights pursuant to Miranda
before

this

Court.

For

are not supported by the evidence
these

reasons,

it

is respectfully

requested that defendant's motion to suppress his statements be
denied.

'"it
RESPECTFULLY s u b m i t t e d t h i s

V^day

o f May, 1 9 9 1 .

DAVID YOCOM

00032

Memorandum
Page 10
MAILING/DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
MAI LED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

J^

dayrof May, 1991.

ADDENDUM D

PRELIMINARY HEARING
EDWARD H. JAMES
CASE #911003552FS
TESTIMONY OF OFFICER NEWREN
DIRECT EXAMINATION
STATE:
A:

State your name and occupation for the record, please?

Gary Newren, I'm employed with Salt Lake City Corp. as a police

officer.
Q:

Are you presently in Detective division?

A:

Yes I am.

Q:

Are you acquainted with the Defendant?

A:

Yes, I am.

Q:

Do you know him as Edward James?

A:

Yes, I do.

Q:

Did you conduct an interview with him shortly after his arrest

on March 28th 1991?
A:

I did.

Q:

What date was it actually, that you interviewed?

A:

I am not sure, I'd have to look at my note there to see the

exact date.
Q:

Was it on or about March 28th?

A:

Yes it was.

Q:

Uh, and who was present during the course of the interview?

A:

Another police officer by the name of Steve Chever, myself, and

Mr. James.
Q:

Was it recorded?

UV0Q9

A:

No, it was not.

Q:

And, uh, prior to the interview did you advise the defendant of

his rights pursuant to Miranda
A:

?

It was not, uh, immediately before hand, uh, there was some

things that we were asking that did not need Miranda and then we
asked Miranda ... when it became apparent.
Q:

.... and you're referring to identification information?

A:

That is correct.

Q:

How did he respond to your Miranda advise?

A:

He indicated to both questions, ya.

Q:

Allright, did you ask him about the burglary that occurred at

355 North 700 West Apartment #3 on that day?
A:

We did

Q:

How did he respond?

A:

He responded that, uh, sometimes he gets things in his head and

that he had done the burglary and gone through the window.
Q:

Did he indicate what he had taken?

A:

He did.

Q:

What did he say he had taken?

A:

He took the stereo and a leather jacket.

Q:

And did you assist Ms. Kilsnak in recovering that property?

A:

I did on the jacket and the stereo was already into evidence

from the patrol officers that had, uh, placed Mr. James into custody.
Q:

Did you return the stereos ....

A:

Yes I did.

- 2

-
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Q:

And how about the leather jacket, where was that located?

A:

That was located at the Rothchild's pawn shop and that was also

returned.
Q:

No further questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION

Q

It's Newren?

A

It is.

Q
A
Q

Uh, you did transport Mr. James to jail?

A

I did not.

Q

Detective Ch... did?

A

No, the patrol officers did the night before.

Q

Oh, he had been booked the night before?

A

That's correct.

Q

And you had him pulled out of the jail?

A

Pardon?

Q

Did you have him pulled out of the jail?

A

We never left the jail, the interview was conducted in the jail?

Q

Okay, was he, had he already been up on the floor in the jail?

A

That is correct.

Q

So he'd been pulled down to, and then,

A

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q

And that was at your request?

A

Yes it was.

- 3 -

U0071

Q:

Was he told why he was being pulled out?

A:

After we got there I explained to him why, what we were doing

there, and our purpose.
Q:

And you indicated that you wanted to do a follow up

investigation of the burglary?
A:

That is correct.

Q:

And you didn't operate .... before that?

A:

No I did not.

Q:

And after you indicated you wanted to do a follow up

investigation of the burglary you proceeded to ask ....
A:

Clarifying his name and different things like that, because of

the unusualness of the Edward and the James and date of birth, and,
Q:

Okay, but after indicating that you wanted a follow up on the

burglary, you proceeded to question him.
A:

I believe I stated to him that myself and Officer Chever,

Detective Chever were doing the follow up investigation of a
burglary that occurred at 355 North on 700 West.
Q:

Uh, and then you proceeded to ask him some questions.

A:

That is correct.

Q:

Okay.

A:

That is also correct.

Q:

Now, some of the questions that you consider benign had to do

And that would still before Miranda?

with his name?
A:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q:

His middle initial?

- 4
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Yes.
His date of birth?
Yes.
His birth place?
Yes.
His current living arrangements?
Yes
His job?
Yes.
His employment?
Yes.
And he remained cooperative throughout that?
Very cooperative.
And then Detective Chevers then asked him what he did for a
living?
A:

That's correct.

Q:

And, uh, is it in response to that that there was an admission

made, you believe?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And still no Miranda?

A:

Yes.

Q:

....uh, at that point would makes the response he's still not

been mirandized?
A:

That is "correct.

Q:

Now that the, uh, stereo, where did that come from, I'm sorry?

- 5 -
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A:

The patrol officers had placed that into evidence, uh, and it

was located at the time that, uh, they had responded to the
investigation of the burglary at that location at the request of May
Kilsnik.
Q:

Was it, it's found at the scene?

A:

It was found in the apartment next to.

Q:

And this was in apartment that Cindy, was Cindy's home?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Do we know Cindy's last name?

A:

Cindy Lee.

STATE:

Just Lee.

Q:

And her apartment was next to the, uh, Kilsacks?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Or her home?

A:

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q:

And that was, that would be immediately adjacent to it?

A:

Yes it is.

Q:

And who pawned the jacket?

A:

It would been a Mary Ann Jaussi.

Q:

Not Edward James?

A:

Yes, that's correct.

Q:

Was Mr. James told anything prior to the interview regarding if

he would work with the officers things might go easier, anything to
that effect?
A:

No.

- 6 -
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Q:

Did you, you indicated to him you were trying to solve the ...?

A:

I indicated to him that we were doing the follow up

investigation on that burglary.
Q:

Did you explain what that meant?

A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Thank you nothing further.

STATE RESTS
ADVISING CLIENT
BINDS OVER
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
vs.

: MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER BOTH
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
: CONSTITUTION
:

EDWARD JAMES,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Case No. 911900562FS
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

:

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 28, 1991, Mr. James, an eighteen year old Native
American, was arrested for the offense of Burglary, a Second
Degree Felony in violation of section 76-6-202, and Theft, in
violation of section 76-6-404 a class A Misdemeanor. Utah Code
Ann. (1953 as amended).

Mr. James was arrested and transported

to the Salt Lake County jail where he was booked on the above
charges.
During the morning of March 29, 1991, at the request of two
Salt Lake City Police Department detectives, Mr. James was
escorted by a jailer to the old booking area of the jail. At one
time this area of the jail served as the location for the booking
process.

Currently, however, this area is used by the Police for

1
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the purpose of conducting interviews.
When Mr. James arrived at this interview area the two
Detectives, officers Newren and Cheevers both white males,
announced they were Police Officers and stated they wanted to do
a follow up investigation of the alleged burglary.

Prior to this

announcement Mr. James had not been told why he had been brought
to this area of the jail.

Before questioning Mr. James, the

officers did not Mirandize him, nor did the officers advise him
of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have
counsel present.
Detective Newren began the questioning by asking Mr. James
to state his name, middle initial, date of birth and birth place.
Detective Newren continued this line of questioning by asking Mr.
James about his current living arrangement, his current job, and
his employment.

Mr. James remained cooperative throughout

detective Newren•s questions.

Then Detective Cheevers questioned

Mr. James about his present employment.

Mr. James responded that

he was presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, stated that
during times when he was unemployed he got into trouble.

Mr.

James then told the two Detectives that it was during these times
of unemployment that he gets "things into his head"
them.

and does

He then admitted to the burglary.
At the time Mr. James made his admissions he had still not

received any Miranda warnings, nor had Mr. James in any way been
advised of his constitutional rights.

Only after Mr. James

admitted to committing the crime he was accused of did he receive
2
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the Miranda warnings which informed him of his constitutional
rights.
POINT I
JAMES1S STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT
AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT
INTRODUCTION:

The fifth amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in part that no person "shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"
Const.Amend. 5. (emphasis added).

U.S.C.A.

Article I Section 12 of the

Utah State Constitution provides that "the accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself". Ut. Const. Art. 1,
sec. 12. (emphasis added).

Mr. James asks this court to construe

Article I, Section 12 as providing greater protection to the
individual than it's federal counterpart.
Mr. James recognizes the trial judge has ruled on the
admissability of his statements under the federal constitution.
See (Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress).

However, he asks this Court to

review and apply the federal standard, as well as the newly
raised state standard, to the facts of his case to preserve all
issues for appeal.

FEDERAL STANDARD:

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.

Ct. 1602 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a person in
custody must be informed of certain constitutional rights before

3
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being interrogated. Id. at 479.
The Miranda Court and subsequent decisions defined
"custody" as when an individual has been deprived by a lawenforcement officer of his freedom of action in any significant
way. Id.

Interrogation is the

functional equivalent." Id.

"express questioning or it's

In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.

291, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
stated, "interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning or it's functional equivalent, but also any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest or custody) that the police should know are
reasonable likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Id. at 300-02.
In this case both parties agree that Mr. James was in
custody and had not received any Miranda warnings when he made
the admissions.

Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)

this Court ruled, under the federal constitution, that the
admissions were freely given and that the detective's questions
were not likely to illicit an incriminating response. See
(Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendants's Motion to Suppress).

However, Elstad

specifically

applies to officers correcting errors made in the initial
prophylactic Miranda procedures.

This case is not about officers

committing errors in the procedure of giving Miranda, but rather
is about officers who have chosen to omit the Miranda warnings
altogether.

For purposes of appeal Mr. James will cite two cases
4
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in support of his contention that the trial judge incorrectly
ruled under the federal constitution, and respectfully asks this
Court to reconsider it's ruling.
In Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) the
Court held that an accused must be apprised of his Miranda rights
if the setting is custodial or accusatorial rather than
investigatory. Id. at 1170 (emphasis added).

The court further

stated it is "at the point the environment" becomes accusatory
that a police officer questions must be prefaced with a Miranda
warning. Id.
The environment created by the two police officers who
questioned Mr. James was accusatorial.

The day prior to the

questioning Mr. James was arrested and held on the burglary
charge.

Without any Miranda warnings the two officers began

questioning Mr. James after requesting he be brought to them.
The purpose of the questioning was to further investigate the
burglary charge Mr. James was being held on.
In Layton City v. Araqon, No. 900247-CA, slip op. at 4 (Ut.
Ct. App. filed June 13, 1991) (copy attached), the Court
carefully indicated in construing the Innis holding, "The
likelihood of incrimination must be determined from all of the
circumstances; the same question may constitute interrogation in
one situation but not in another." Id.

Furthermore the Court

elaborated "the main focus is on whether the suspect is likely to
incriminate himself in response [to a question]." Id. at 5.
(emphasis in original). The focus is not whether the two
5
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detectives believed their questions would lead to incriminating
responds, but whether Mr. Jamies was likely to incriminate
himself.
Mr. James had been accused of the crime and was the sole
focus of the criminal investigation.

He had received no warnings

safeguarding his constitutional rights prior to the police
beginning the questioning.

Cultural and age differences also

increased the likelihood of Mr. James making an un-mirandized
admission in an already inherently coercive atmosphere of a
police custodial interrogation.

Mr. James is an eighteen year

Native American man who was subjected to his first adult booking
charge and who was being questioned by two white, experienced
police officers.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS:
Based on an historical analysis as well as precedent from
other cases, Mr. James asks this Court to suppress his statements
under the state constitution should the Court choose not to do so
under a review of the federal constitutional analysis.
Historically, the right to refuse to give evidence against
oneself was of critical importance to the drafters of Utah's
constitution.

The framers of the constitution were well aware

and suspicious of governmental interference into the lives of
Utahn's.

Mormon settlers were persecuted by various regional

governments.

The Mormons had been continually persecuted for

their religious beliefs since their inception as a religion.

See

6
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L. Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience

pg. 67-69

(1980).
With a history so replete with government sanctioned
persecution and intimidation, the drafters of the Utah State
Constitution sought protection from governmental interference.
The original drafters intended Article I Section 12 to protect
them more than the Federal Constitution did.
The courts of Utah have at times interpreted the state
constitution broader than the federal counterparts to insure
greater protection for criminal defendants.

For example,

in In re Matter of Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No.
CS-1., 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act which
provided that upon application and approval of the District
Court, for good cause shown, prosecuting attorneys could, among
other things, subpoena witnesses and grant transactional
immunity.
In considering the constitutional self incrimination
challenge to the Act the Court stated, "Article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution is arguably narrower [than it's federal
counterpart] because it states only that 'the accused1 has the
privilege [against self incrimination]. Id. at 646. Rather than
adopt a view that the privilege only attaches once charges have
been brought, the Court embraced the common law approach that
f,

all witness must be able to claim the privilege if the purpose

of the privilege is to be satisfied." Id.

The Court reasoned

7
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otherwise the state would be allowed to "poke about in the
speculation of finding something chargeable." Id. citing 8
Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2251, at 314 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Under the rational of In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d
at 646, Mr. James could legitimately invoke the privilege under
the state constitution once he became either a suspect or a
witness. In addition, the Court also cautioned "the privilege is
intended to protect against confessions secured by sheer force of
psychological intimidation," (citations omitted) and compared the
situation to the "psychological compulsion" inherent in a police
custodial inquiry. Id. at 648.
In State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1991) the
Court set a stringent due process standard far more protective of
individual rights under the State Constitution than it's federal
counterpart. See also Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991).

Mr. James asks this Court to do the

same.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme
Court relied on Article I, section 14 in deciding that "an
officer's opening a car door to examine a VIN on a door jamb" id.
at 465, constituted an unreasonable search under the state
constitution.

The Court recognized that federal fourth

amendment-law, especially in the context of automobile searches,
"has been a source of much confusion among judges, lawyers and
police." Id. at 466.

Although the Court indicated that if it

were deciding the case under the federal law, it "would hold that
8
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a search was conducted within the meaning of the forth
amendment, " it nevertheless reached its decision under the state
constitution.
The Court in In re Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 7th
District Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) announced that
the use of "accused" in Article I, sec. 12, applies as soon as
someone becomes a witness to a case in the context of invoking
the privilege of self incrimination.

Certainly the same rational

would apply to the use of "accused" with regards to the right to
counsel which is also set forth in the language of Article I,
sec. 12. Additional support for this reasoning can be found in
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Sampson, 143 Utah
Adv. Rep 12 (1990).

In Sampson the court stated, "Moreover, as

an arm of the State, the police have a responsibility to protect
the constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on the
side of giving the Miranda warnings before they are strictly
required advances that function"....

Id. at 20 n.12.

CONCLUSION
As indicated above, the language of the Utah constitution
provides broader individual protections than its federal
counterpart. It has also been established that the framers of the
Utah constitution intended to afford the individual great
protection against government incursion.

Based on this unique

constitutional development and the precedent cited above, we move
this Court to find greater protection for criminal defendant's
9
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right to silence and to right to counsel under Article I, section
12 than the federal counterparts.

We ask this Court to suppress

any statements Mr. James made in violation of his state or
federal constitutional rights.

DATED this

?) fdday

of July, 1991.

Rat^
AN
DEFENDANT

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt LAke City, Utah 84111,
this

-^_

day of July, 1991.
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